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## The Armed Forces

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On the eve of the Peloponnesian War Perikles famously advised the Athenians how they could win (Thucydides 2.13.1-8). He reassured assemblygoers that they already had the required funds and armed forces for victory. The first corps that Perikles mentioned was the 13,000 hoplites. The next two were the 1200-strong cavalry and the 1600 archers. The last corps of which he spoke was the navy of 300 triremes. This chapter’s aim is to go behind Perikles’s famous numbers. For each corps that he mentioned it studies the legal status of corps-members and their social background. The chapter explores how they were recruited into their corps and subsequently mobilised for campaigns. It establishes each corps’s history and organisation. By comparing all military branches this chapter reveals the common practices that the *dēmos* (‘people’) used to manage their armed forces. It explains the common expectations that they brought to this management.

## Hoplites

The hoplites of Classical Athens were divided into 10 *taxeis* or units. With 1 *taxis* for each of the 10 tribes a unit was often simply called a *phylē* or tribe (e.g. Lysias 13.79). The division of Athenians into tribes was a reform of Kleisthenes.<sup>1</sup> Soon after 506 BC he divided Attica into 3 regions. In each region neighboring demes were grouped together into 10 *trittyes* (‘thirds’). A tribe had one *trittys* from each of the 3 regions. The Athenians believed that Kleisthenes had made them stronger militarily (e.g. Herodotus 5.78-9). It is likely that a public army of hoplites was another of his reforms. Greek hoplites typically fought as part of a coalition army. When they did, those from a *polis* (‘city-state’) formed a distinct contingent. A contingent from Classical Athens was divided into *phylai* (e.g. Thucydides 6.101.3-5). In land battles Athenian hoplites thus always fought beside fellow *phylētai* (‘tribesmen’). In the 480s the Athenians created a board of 10 taxiarchs to command their hoplite *taxeis*. It was the *taxiarchos* who subdivided his tribe’s hoplites into *lochoi* or subunits (e.g. Aristophanes *Acharnians* 575, 1074). The number of a tribe’s *lochoi* varied in relation to how many hoplites Athens had put into the field.<sup>2</sup>

The hoplites were the first branch of the armed forces that Perikles mentioned in his last pre-war speech (Thucydides 2.13.6-7). The 13,000 of them who were liable for active service were the largest corps after the navy. Perikles distinguished them ‘from both the oldest (*hoi presbytatoi*) and the youngest (*hoi neōtatoi*) and all the metics who were hoplites.’ This second group of hoplites normally only manned the city-walls and

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<sup>1</sup> Hansen 1991, 34-5.

<sup>2</sup> Crowley 2012, 36-9.

Attica's forts. M. H. Hansen's work on ancient Greek demography establishes that there were 60,000 citizens in 432/1.<sup>3</sup> Certainly the *neōtatoi* were the precursors of the fourth-century ephebes, who were 18 and 19 year-olds ([Aristotle] *Constitution of the Athenians* 42.1-5). The *presbytatoi* were most probably 50 to 59 years of age.<sup>4</sup> In the table of age-distribution that Hansen uses those aged between 20 and 49 years represent 72.7 percent of adult males.<sup>5</sup> In 432/1 the number of Athenians in this age-band was 43,620. The 13,000 active-service hoplites therefore represented 29.8% of them.

This 30% came from relatively prosperous families. Athens probably began to pay hoplites at the same time as it did sailors in the 470s. By 433/2 the regular *misthos* ('pay') for both was 1 drachma ('dr.') per day (e.g. Thucydides 3.17.4). Nevertheless each *hoplitēs* had to purchase his own equipment. This was not cheap because a shield and a spear cost up to 30 dr. and bronze armor up to 100 dr. His ownership of a slave is further evidence of his prosperity. Thucydides believed that every Athenian hoplite brought along a slave (e.g. 7.75.4). The Athenians judged it unsafe to arm slaves for land battles and so used them only as baggage-carriers. In Classical Athens it cost about 200 dr. to buy a slave.<sup>6</sup> Even for a skilled laborer, who earned 1 dr. per day, this was expensive. Unsurprisingly many poor citizens did not own a slave (e.g. Lysias 24.6).

The old argument was that the *telos* of an Athenian determined the corps in which he served.<sup>7</sup> In the 570s Solon had divided the Athenians into four such *telē* or income-classes (e.g. [Aristotle], *Constitution of the Athenians* 7.3). Service as a hoplite, it was argued, was the duty of every member of his third lowest *telos*. This class, called *zeugitai* ('yoke-men'), produced at least 200 *medimnoi* of agricultural produce.<sup>8</sup> The top two *telē* were called 'the 500-*medimnoi* men' and the *hippeis* ('horsemen'). It was long argued that they had to serve as, respectively, trierarchs and horsemen. Members of the lowest class, who were called *thētes* ('hired laborers'), were free to volunteer to be sailors or archers. In the last twenty years the study of ancient Greek agriculture has refuted this old argument. H. van Wees puts beyond doubt that a *zeugitēs* needed 8.7 hectares in order to qualify for his *telos*.<sup>9</sup> Because Attica only had 96,000 hectares of arable land, there was simply not enough for all 13,000 active-service hoplites to be *zeugitai*. When van Wees factors in the land that the other income-classes owned, it emerges that the top three *telē* provided only one half of the hoplites. On the eve of the Peloponnesian War the other half were *thētes*. *Telos*-membership, it appears, played no role in the recruitment of hoplites.

Instead a non-elite Athenian probably simply chose whether he would be a hoplite, an archer or a sailor, when, as an 18 year-old, he was registered as a citizen in his deme. If he decided to be a *hoplitēs*, this choice was written beside his name in the *lēxiarkhikon grammateion* (e.g. *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 138.1-7), which was the register that a demarch

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<sup>3</sup> Hansen 1991, 55.

<sup>4</sup> Christ 2001, 404.

<sup>5</sup> Hansen 1986, 12-13.

<sup>6</sup> Pritchard 2015, 84-5.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. Spence 1993, 180-2.

<sup>8</sup> The *medimnos* was a dry measure of around 52 litres.

<sup>9</sup> Van Wees 2001, 47-54.

maintained of adult Athenians in his deme. Before a campaign each taxiarch drew up the *katalogos* ('conscription list') for his tribe (e.g. Aristophanes *Peace* 1173, 179-83). He got the names of conscripts by asking the demes in his *phylē* to nominate them (cf. [Demosthenes] 50.6). Commanders were not supposed to conscript hoplites who had recently served (e.g. Lysias 9.4, 15). Each tribe's *katalogos* was displayed under the statue of its eponymous hero in the agora. The statues of the tribal demi-gods formed a monument that served as the state's noticeboard. On display too was the date when the conscripts had to muster and where they had to do so (e.g. Aristophanes *Birds* 450). Most often they mustered in the athletics field of the Lyceum, which was just outside the city walls (see Chapter 22). But musters could also be held in, for example, the agora or the meeting place of the assembly on the Hill of the Pnyx (e.g. Andocides 1.45). In the last two locations *horoi* ('boundary markers') have been found. Their inscriptions state that a *trittys* of a tribe ends and another *trittys* of the same tribe or the next tribe begins. These *horoi* presumably helped the *taxiarchos* to call the roll of his tribe.<sup>10</sup>

## Horsemen

The second corps that Perikles mentioned in his last pre-war speech was the cavalry (Thucydides 2.13.8). In 432/1 it consisted of 1000 *hippeis* ('horsemen') and 200 *hippotoxotai* or mounted archers (Andocides 3.5). The *hippeis*, who were always citizens, were likewise divided into 10 tribal units. Each *phylē* of 100 horsemen was commanded by a *phylarkhos* or phylarch (e.g. Aristophanes *Lysistrata* 561-2). Two *hipparkhoi* ('hipparchs') commanded the corps as a whole (e.g. *Birds* 798-800). *Hippeis* were conscripted for a campaign in the same way as hoplites: their names were placed on a tribal *katalogos*. When he compiled a conscription list, however, a phylarch had access to what a taxiarch never did: a central record of *hippeis* (e.g. Lysias 16.13). Athens simply did not have enough secretaries to maintain a central record for 13,000 hoplites, but could do so for the cavalry because of its much smaller size.

The cavalry-corps was most probably created in the 450s.<sup>13</sup> Initially it had only 3 units of 100 *hippeis* each (Andocides 3.5; *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 511). The Parthenon, which was completed by 438/7 BC, gives a firm date by which the cavalry had been expanded to 10 units. This branch participated in the *pompē* ('procession') of the Great Panathenaia (e.g. Xenophon *On the Cavalry-Commander* 3.1-2), which was the focus of this temple's north and south friezes. The Parthenon's south frieze most clearly depicts 10 distinct units of *hippeis*, which have different uniforms (Fig. 29.1). This is surely a depiction of the 10 tribes of the expanded corps.

Serving as a horsemen was much more demanding than being a hoplite. Each *hippeus* had to buy his own warhorse and a horse for his slave *hippokomos* or groom (e.g. Xenophon *On the Cavalry-Commander* 2.6; 4.4; 5.6). The two horses probably cost him 500 dr. His service was also a full-time commitment because *hippeis* had constantly to train and always to be ready for deployment (e.g. 1.2, 5-6, 9-10, 18). This

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<sup>10</sup> Pollux 8.115; Christ 2001, 407.

<sup>13</sup> Bugh 1988, 41-4.

training took place in or around the *astu* or urban centre (e.g. Aristophanes *Knights* 119-20). Corps-members regularly paraded in the agora or, for example, in one or another of the athletics fields outside the city-walls (see Chapter 22). In order to find enough recruits for their expanded corps the *dēmos* decided to give them two subsidies. The first was a *katastasis* ('setting-up loan') so that a recruit could buy his warhorse. The second was a *misthos* of 2 dr. per day year-round. Because a *hippeis* needed only 1 dr. for the fodder of his two horses,<sup>14</sup> he could take home the same amount as a hoplite.

[Use ½ a page or more to place Figure 29.1 about here.]

Solon's income-classes played no role in the recruitment of horsemen.<sup>16</sup> This explains why '*hippeis*' in our sources are members of either his second highest *telos* or the cavalry.<sup>17</sup> The term was never simultaneously used to describe both groups. Instead service as horsemen was a legal requirement of 'those who were most able in terms of money and physical capacity' (Xenophon *On the Cavalry-Commander* 1.9-12). Indeed hipparchs could compel 20 year-olds who met these criteria to join up. There was a very good reason for the first criterion. The 500 dr. that a *hippeus* had to spend on his horses was at least five times more than what a hoplite paid for his equipment. This was the equivalent of two years of wages for a skilled laborer. While the state lent him the money for his own horse, he had to pay this loan back after 10 to 15 years, when he retired from the corps. This would have been daunting to everyone except those who knew that they would inherit enough to cover a *katastasis*.

Therefore it is unsurprising that Aristophanes believed that all 1000 *hippeis* belonged to the elite (e.g. *Knights* 225, 266, 579-80, 842, 1369-72). Demography seems to confirm his belief.<sup>18</sup> Horsemen were aged between 20 and 32.5 years. In the age-distribution table that Hansen uses they account for 37.2 percent. In 432/1 there were, in this age-band, 22,320, of which the 1000 horsemen were 4.5 percent. This is slightly less than the 5 percent of Athenians who were wealthy.<sup>19</sup> Simply belonging to the elite made a physically fit young Athenian liable for cavalry service.

The horses that the 200 mounted archers rode were owned by the state (e.g. Lysias 15.5). After 412/11, when the *dēmos* began to reduce pay for the corps, the *hippotoxotai* always earned twice as much as the 1000 horsemen (e.g. fr. 6.73-81 Carey). This heavier subsidization suggests that the *hippotoxotai* were much less able to bear the cost of corps-membership. It strengthens the case that they did not belong to the elite (e.g. 15.6). Athenians certainly served as mounted archers (e.g. [Aristotle] *Constitution of the Athenians* 24.3). Nevertheless they did not serve beside the *hippeis* in the 10

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<sup>14</sup> Spence 1993, 290-5.

<sup>16</sup> E.g. Bugh 1988, 20-34.

<sup>17</sup> For the first usage see e.g. Thucydides 3.16.1 For the second see e.g. Aristophanes *Knights* 225, 550.

<sup>18</sup> Pritchard 2018b, 447-8.

<sup>19</sup> E.g. Pritchard 2010, 13.

tribes. Rather they formed their own unit under the direct command of a hipparch (Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.3.1). We last hear of mounted archers in the 380s.

## Archers

In 432/1 the third corps that Pericles mentioned were the 1600 archers (Thucydides 2.13.8). The Athenians had no *toxotai* ('archers') at the battle of Marathon in 490/89. Because, ten years later, they could put such soldiers on their triremes at Salamis (e.g. Aeschylus, *Persians* 454-61), this corps must have been created in the 480s. In 483/2 Themistocles convinced the Athenians to expand massively their public navy (Thucydides 1.14.1-2). The 200 triremes that they had after this shipbuilding was Greece's largest public navy. Archers had a great deal to contribute on their decks: they could kill enemy rowers from a distance and help to stop any hostile boarding of their triremes. The *dēmos* probably saw archers as a good way to increase the military advantages that they sought. It is thus likely that they decided to create the archer corps as part of their naval expansion in the late 480s.

The Athenians in this corps were undoubtedly *thētes* because, as we will see, they had joined up as a way of escaping dire poverty.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless there is no evidence that their membership of this *telos* had made them liable for archer service. *Toxotai* presumably joined the corps on a voluntary basis as hoplites did theirs. The *dēmos* also created a board of *toxarkhoi* or archer-corps-commanders (e.g. *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1186.20). Their corps's small size allowed these commanders to maintain a central record of members.<sup>21</sup> *Toxarkhoi* were required to draw up a *katalogos* of conscripts for each land or naval campaign (e.g. *ML* 23.23-6). Therefore conscription was common across the terrestrial branches of the armed forces. In other respects, however, the archer corps was differently organized. Many corps-members were actually metics.<sup>22</sup> Because membership of a *phylē*, in Classical Athens, was a prerogative of citizenship (e.g. *Lysias* 23.2-3), the inclusion of metics ruled out the corps's organization by tribes. Indeed it is not clear that *toxotai* even had regular units.

The *dēmos* may have understood the military advantages that their archer corps gave them (e.g. *Andocides* 3.70), but they still held archers in low regard. The Athenians believed that a brave man bore *kindunoi* ('dangers') in spite of the personal risk.<sup>23</sup> In bearing them he accepted the possibility of death in battle. In land battles archers, by contrast, ran away, when the other side got too close (e.g. *Thucydides* 2.79.6). Because they could shoot their arrows from a safe distance (e.g. 4.32.4), they bore much lower risks. This meant that archers appeared not to meet the popular definition of *aretē* ('courage'). Playwrights and public speakers did not fail to point this out (e.g. *Euripides Heracles* 158-64, 187-204). Therefore the first reason why the *dēmos* esteemed archers to be lowly was that they judged them to be cowards. The second reason is that they saw archery as a predominantly barbarian mode of combat.

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<sup>20</sup> For citizens as *toxotai* see e.g. *Lysias* 34.4; *IG* i<sup>3</sup>1032.168-71.

<sup>21</sup> Pritchard 2018a, 92.

<sup>22</sup> E.g. *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 138.3, 6-7; Pritchard 2019, 69.

<sup>23</sup> E.g. *Lysias* 2.12, 15, 20, 23, 25; *Thucydides* 2.39.1, 4; Pritchard 2018c, 239.

In fact many or possibly even most of the metics in the archer corps were barbarians.<sup>24</sup> Athens also had a police force of 300 barbarians (see below). These *dēmosioi* ('public slaves') were armed as archers (e.g. Aristophanes *Knights* 65). In the eyes of the *dēmos* the main combat-mode of the Persians was archery (e.g. Aeschylus *Persians* 26, 29, 147-8, 237-8, 278-9, 926).

The late M. Trundle rightly asked why some Athenians chose to be archers in spite of this low regard.<sup>25</sup> The *dēmos* considered *toxotai* to be poorest branch of the army (e.g. *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 138.3-4). It is possible that what attracted citizens to it was pay and the fact that it cost less than hoplite service. But the same was the case with the navy. In addition the *dēmos* held sailors in much higher regard, seeing them as no less courageous than hoplites.<sup>26</sup> Yet, the archer corps offered much better employment-conditions.<sup>27</sup> Athens required *toxotai* to be ready for immediate deployment and always to be practicing their perishable skill. To meet comparable requirements horsemen were employed full-time. There is good evidence that archers enjoyed the same conditions (e.g. [Aristotle] *Constitution of the Athenians* 24.1-2). Sailors, by contrast, earned pay only for their days on the high seas.

Here is the answer to Trundle's good question: some poor Athenians chose to be archers because they needed full-time employment. Yet offering such steady jobs did not come cheaply. In 432/1 archers also earned 1 dr. per day (e.g. Thucydides 3.17.4; 5.47.6). Consequently their *misthos* used up 10% of the state's annual budget.<sup>28</sup> After the Peloponnesian War Athens found it immensely difficult to pay for such recurring costs. By the time of the Corinthian War budget problems had forced the Athenians to disband the archer corps.

The policing of Classical Athens was in the hands of 300 Scythian archers.<sup>29</sup> The Athenians probably first purchased these *dēmosioi* in the mid-fifth century (e.g. Andocides 3.4-5). These archers were command by the executive committee of the democratic *boulē* ('council'). Their main duty was to act as bouncers in the assembly. They moved citizens loitering in the agora towards the Hill of the Pnyx, when an assembly meeting was about to start (e.g. Aristophanes *Acharnians* 20-2). When the executive committee ordered them, they threw out unruly assemblygoers (e.g. 54). At other times they made arrests or stood guard in the agora or, for example, on the Acropolis (e.g. Aristophanes *Lysistrata* 397-475; *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 45.14-17). The last mention of this force occurs in a comedy of the 390s (Aristophanes *Assembly-Women* 143, 258-9).

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<sup>24</sup> E.g. Thucydides 8.98.1-2; *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1172.35-7.

<sup>25</sup> Trundle 2010, 143-4.

<sup>26</sup> E.g. Aeschylus *Persians* 337-47, 357-60, 386-401; Aristophanes *Knights* 563-73; Lysias 2.24, 33, 40, 42-3, 47-8; Pritchard 2019, 109-37.

<sup>27</sup> Pritchard 2019, 74-6.

<sup>28</sup> In 432/1 this budget was 1000 t. (Xenophon *The March Up Country* 7.1.27).

<sup>29</sup> Pritchard 2019, 76-8.

## Sailors

The last forces that Pericles mentioned in his pre-war speech were the 300 triremes (Thucydides 2.13.8). It was the duty of all citizens to fight for the state.<sup>30</sup> In 432/1 two thirds of them met this duty by serving in the navy. In the first several years of the Peloponnesian War Athens regularly had 20,000 sailors at sea simultaneously. The 200-strong crew of a standard Athenian trireme was divided into four groups. Two were the 4 *toxotai* and the 10 *epibatai* (e.g. Thucydides 2.23.1-2). The third group consisted of the 6 petty officers (e.g. *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1032.35-46, 156-67). These officers were called collectively *hē hypēresia* ('the assistance') because they assisted the trierarch. The fourth group were the 170 *nautai*. The trireme got its name from the three levels of the benches on which these rowers sat. The *dēmos* judged that the *thranitai*, who sat on the top bench, contributed the most (e.g. Aristophanes *Acharnians* 162-3). A trireme had 62 top-bench, 54 middle-bench and 54 lower-bench rowers (Fig. 29.2).

[Use ½ a page or more to place Fig. 29.2 about here.]

A trireme crew was led by a *triērarchos* ('trireme-commander'). What differentiated this command from other forms of military service was the huge cost. The state left the recruitment of *nautai* to individual trierarchs. While it paid the *misthos* of sailors, *triērarchoi* that wanted the best of them paid more than this wage (e.g. [Demosthenes] 50.7). At sea trierarchs also paid for ship repairs and replacement rowers (e.g. 12, 15-16, 18, 23). The average attested cost of a trierarchy was 4436 dr.<sup>31</sup> Therefore it is easy to understand why the *dēmos* made the trierarchy one of the two liturgies that the wealthy were obliged to perform (e.g. Lysias 29.4). Each year the generals drew up a list of those who might be conscripted for the trierarchy.<sup>32</sup> He who was conscripted was exempted from being so again for two years (e.g. Isaïos 7.38). The wealthy thus met their military duty by alternately serving in the army and the navy. In order to keep track of his expenses a trierarch always maintained a detailed crew-list (Lysias 32.26). In 405/4 the *dēmos* honored the sailors of their eight triremes that escaped from Aegospotami.<sup>33</sup> They did so by setting up a monument with their crew-lists. What survives of this stela provides the crew-lists of four of these warships (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1032).

*Epibatai* were regular members of the hoplite corps who were serving in a fleet.<sup>34</sup> While marines were volunteers (e.g. *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 60.9-16), there still needed to be a roll call in order to ensure that all had kept their promise to serve. For the sake of this call the Athenians installed the same *horoi* in their naval harbor at Zea as they had in the other muster grounds for hoplites: *trittys* markers (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1127-31). If *epibatai* also embarked *trittys* by *trittys*, on a single trireme they should have come only from one *phylē* or two in the official order of the tribes. *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1032 recorded the deme-names of citizen sailors.

<sup>30</sup> E.g. Aristophanes *Wasps* 117-20; Lysias 16.17; Pritchard 2019, 45, 101-2.

<sup>31</sup> Pritchard 2015, 97, 128 n. 40.

<sup>32</sup> Gabrielsen 1994, 68-74.

<sup>33</sup> Pritchard 2019, 84-8.

<sup>34</sup> Pritchard 2019, 42-3.

Because a citizen's deme determined his tribe, it lets us test this hypothesis. On each of this stela's triremes the marines were scattered right across the tribes (25-9, 279-89, 411). They, clearly, had not embarked by tribes. The employment of metics in the archer corps simply ruled out the use of tribes for embarking the conscripted *toxotai*.

The most-important petty officer on a trireme was the *kybernētēs* or helmsman. He controlled the steering oars and so, with the help of the *prōiratēs* ('bow officer'), navigated the trireme (e.g. Aristophanes, *Knights* 541-4). These 2 petty officers had 5 deckhands each. The orders of the *kybernētēs* were relayed to the rowers by the *keleustēs* ('rowing master'), who, along with the *aulētēs* ('aulos player'), set the rowing speed (e.g. Euripides *Helen* 1575-6). The final 2 petty officers were the *naupēgos* ('shipwright') and the *pentēkontarchos* or pursuer (e.g. [Demosthenes] 50.18, 25). Without *hē hypēresia* a trireme could not function (Thucydides 8.1.2). The classical Athenians thus preferred to reserve these indispensable roles for fellow citizens (e.g. 1.143.1). Their mobilization had two stages. In the first the state conscripted the required number of *hypēresiai* (e.g. 6.31.3). The second stage saw the trierarchs compete with each other to hire the best of these conscripts by offering bonuses (e.g. [Demosthenes] 50.5). Because this second stage ruled out any role for the *phylai*, it is unsurprising that each *hypēresia* on IG i<sup>3</sup> 1032 came from non-contiguous tribes (35-46, 156-67, 290-301).

Rowers were never formally recruited into the armed forces. Rather they simply turned up in the Piraeus, when a fleet was just about to depart. Trierarchs competed with each other to hire the best of these volunteers (e.g. Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 545-54). Most of the *nautai* whom they hired were fellow Athenians (e.g. Thucydides 8.72-89). Indeed from 433 to 426 there were normally 50% more Athenians in this branch of the armed forces than were required for the fleets of any particular year. In spite of this, a trierarch always had to hire non-citizens in order to find his 170 *nautai*. Most of these foreigners were metics, but others were simply from *poleis* ('city-states') in the Athenian empire (e.g. IG i<sup>3</sup> 1032.417-18, 71-104). While the Athenians never used slaves in land battles, they found that giving them an oar was safe. Therefore trierarchs also employed slave rowers.<sup>35</sup>

Since these commanders relied on non-citizen rowers, many Athenian *nautai* clearly did not row every year. This suggests that their service-pattern was similar to hoplites and trierarchs: after serving in a fleet they had a rest for a year or two. The use of the market to mobilize rowers and the non-citizen status of many of them ruled out tribal organization. On each of the triremes of IG i<sup>3</sup> 1032 there were 'citizen rowers' from almost every *phylē* (3-13, 50-67, 172-211, 305-19).

## **Conclusion: The Common Practices across the Armed Forces**

In all branches Solon's income-classes played no roles. It was simply the obligation of every citizen to serve in one branch or another. Non-elite Athenians were free to choose the corps that best suited them. Elite citizens did not have the same choice. The *dēmos* made it compulsory for them to serve as trierarchs. As young men

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<sup>35</sup> Pritchard 2019, 99-101; IG I<sup>3</sup> 1032.105-33, 227-75, 357-99, 449-84.



they were legally obliged to join the cavalry-corps. *Telos*-membership thus had no impact on an Athenian's military obligation nor the branch in which he served. Conscription was also not limited to the top three income-classes. As many hoplites, for example, came from Solon's fourth *telos*, their conscription-lists always included *thētes*. The *dēmos* did not expect to fight all the time. In their eyes a citizen who did so periodically fulfilled his duty to fight for the state. Therefore they granted hoplites who had recently served a legal right to a rest. They judged it enough for Athenian rowers to serve periodically. For every corps the Athenians created written records of those corps-members who were on a campaign. For the land forces corps- or unit-commanders maintained these records. For the navy this responsibility generally fell to individual trierarchs. Tribal organization was a lot less common in the armed forces. Because membership of a tribe was a right that only citizens enjoyed, those corps that had non-citizens as members could not be so organized. The only Athenians who fought alongside fellow tribesmen were hoplites and cavalrymen.

### Further Reading

This chapter summarizes Pritchard 2019, 28-137. For more on the hoplites see Christ 2001 and Crowley 2012. On the horsemen see Pritchard 2018b and Spence 1993. For the archers see Pritchard 2018a and Trundle 2010, 145-52. On naval personnel see Gabrielsen 1994 and Pritchard 2018c.

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## Captions

Figure 29.1: Horsemen ride in the procession of the Great Panathenaea that is depicted on the Parthenon. Relief block of the Parthenon frieze, 447/6-432/1 BC. Athens, Acropolis Museum, inv. no. 862. Photograph courtesy of H. R. Goette.

Figure 29.2: The top-bench rowers and the three levels of benches on a trireme are depicted on fragments of a victory monument for the ship race at the Great Panathenaea. Attic marble relief, c. 410-400 B.C. Athens, Acropolis Museum, inv. no. 1339. Photograph courtesy of H. R. Goette.